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During the past two decades, scholars have noted a global expansion of judicial power and court-
led rights revolutions. Far from leading a rights-revolution, the Constitutional Court of Turkey 
became renowned for its restrictive take on civil liberties during this period. Why are some high 
courts more activist than others in protecting and expanding civil rights and liberties? I argue that 
judicial power and judicial independence offer incomplete explanations of judicial activism on 
questions of rights. Even powerful courts are activist only selectively, using their clout to protect 
some groups while suppressing the demands of others. Building on perspectives on legal 
mobilization and judicial entrenchment, I argue that the socio-political alliances in which high 
courts and judiciaries participate explain the selective nature of their activism. The initial 
parameters of these alliances are set during critical junctures when formerly dominant coalitions 
are displaced and new institutions entrench new alliances. Such alliances are not static, however, 
and struggles within alliances can transform high courts’ orientations on rights questions. 
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In September 1971, a military imposed cabinet in Turkey amended Turkey’s constitution 
to remove the guarantees of judicial independence that had been established with the 1961 
Constitution. This amendment was struck down by the Constitutional Court of Turkey (CCT) in 
January 1977. Reviewing the constitutionality of amendments was not one of the powers granted 
to the Court in the Constitution. Indeed, following the Court’s de facto establishment of this 
power in an earlier ruling, the Constitution had been amended to state explicitly that the Court 
could not review the substantial constitutionality of amendments. The 1977 ruling showed that 
“the least dangerous branch” in Turkey was willing and able to make creative rulings and 
challenge influential quarters on important political questions. Indeed, from its establishment in 
1962 until 1999, the CCT struck down more than half the statutes referred to it, establishing itself 
as an important party in the policy process and a central power to be reckoned with.  
Despite its assertiveness in challenging government laws and constitutional amendments, 
the Court took a decidedly passive role in one key area. During the 1990s, the bulk of Turkish 
human rights litigation was taking place not at the Constitutional Court of Turkey in Ankara, but 
at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Why was the Constitutional Court of 
Turkey, which frequently ruled against the government and occasionally made controversial 
judgments unwilling to employ this power on human rights questions to lead a rights revolution?  
This question is part of a broader question about judicial behavior: Why would a 
relatively powerful and independent court, such as the Constitutional Court of Turkey, be 
unwilling to protect and expand civil rights and liberties? The question becomes even more 
puzzling in the light of a comparative assessment. Scholars have noted a global expansion of 
judicial power in the past two decades (Holland 1991; Tate 1995; Stone Sweet 2000; Amit 2004) 
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and documented rights revolutions in various settings, stretching from South Africa to Eastern 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East (Epp 1998; Schwartz 2000; Hirschl 2000). The Hungarian and 
South African courts’ decisions to abolish the death penalty on human rights grounds mark the 
high tide of these constitutional revolutions spearheaded by courts. During the same period, the 
1990s, the Constitutional Court of Turkey seemed to swim against this international tide. It 
closed down fifteen political parties that demanded official recognition for Kurdish ethnic 
identity or Islamic religious identity. Unlike new courts in Eastern Europe and South Africa, 
which have been celebrated for their positive contribution to democratic transitions, the CCT was 
standing in the way of the liberalization of Turkish democracy during the 1990s. Why did the 
Turkish Court seem to be moving against the current? What makes some high courts more 
activist than others, particularly in protecting civil rights and liberties? 
I argue that the CCT’s failure to expand civil rights and liberties cannot be explained by 
its weakness vis-à-vis the other branches. Indeed, the CCT was both independent and powerful, I 
claim, but was activist only selectively. That is, the Court used its clout to protect some groups 
and values while suppressing the demands of others. I maintain that the socio-political alliances 
in which high courts and judiciaries participate explain the selective nature of their activism. The 
initial parameters of these alliances are set during constitutional transitions when formerly 
dominant coalitions are displaced and a new coalition entrenches its own values and takes 
measures to lock in its power. Such alliances are not static, however, and struggles within 
alliances can transform high courts’ orientations on rights questions. 
The growing body of research and theory on non-US courts focuses primarily on courts’ 
relations with the other political branches and problematizes why self-interested politicians 
would be willing to delegate power to an independent court (Stone Sweet 2000; Hirschl 2000; 
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2004; Moustafa 2002; 2003), how bargaining among political parties during a democratic 
transition affects the choice of judicial institutions (Magalhaes 1999; Smithey and Ishiyama 2000; 
Ginsburg 2003), which high courts are likely to survive disgruntled executives and legislatures 
(Schwartz 2000; Epstein et al. 2001) and which features of the political system promote judicial 
activism (Holland 1991; Edelman 1995; Tate 1995; Smithey and Ishiyama 2002; Helmke 2002; 
Iaryczower et al. 2002; Ginsburg 2003).  
These scholars study constitutional courts predominantly from a principal-agent 
framework. They problematize why self interested politicians (the principals) would delegate 
power to a constitutional court (the agent), which can overturn legislation. Principal-agent 
scholars argue that uncertainty about future political outcomes provides politicians with an 
incentive to empower independent judiciaries to monitor their initial bargain—the constitution—
with other political parties. The consensus in this literature is that politicians design courts with 
greater independence and broader access when there is greater uncertainty about the future 
during a constitutional transition. Uncertainty is conceptualized as a function of the relative 
distribution of power during the transition, measured by vote-shares of political parties in the 
first post-transition elections (Magalhaes 1999; Smithey and Ishiyama 2000; Ginsburg 2003). 
Once a court with review power is established, the argument continues, opposition groups and 
minorities have an incentive to mobilize the court to reverse legislative defeats or to secure 
policy preferences. The process further empowers the judiciary and simultaneously leads to the 
deepening of basic rights as long as courts remain within boundaries tolerated by the other 
branches (Holland 1993; Stone Sweet 2000: 55; Ginsburg 2003: 66-77). Powerful courts emerge 
to protect human rights, in this view, where executives and legislatures are weak or divided. In 
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particular, the literature on non-US and non-Western courts frequently equates judicial 
independence from the other branches1 with activist rulings on rights.2  
Turkey provides us with a case where an outgoing regime wrote a liberal Constitution in 
1961 and established an independent constitutional court to guard it. Although power was not 
evenly distributed among the groups participating in constitution-making, a powerful and 
independent court was established, along with other non-majoritarian institutions, such as the 
National Security Council, the State Planning Organization, and the High Council of Judges. The 
1961 Constitution abandoned parliamentary supremacy in favor of a system of “separation of 
powers” and “checks and balances”. Simultaneously, it established a liberal framework for the 
protection of civil rights and liberties, stating that restrictions on rights “cannot infringe on the 
substance of a right even if for such reasons as the public interest, general morality, public order, 
social justice, or national security” (1961 Turkish Const. art. 11). From the perspective of 
evolutionary theories of judicial power and the expansion of rights, the 1960-61 transition should 
have led to an incremental and progressive expansion of civil rights and liberties, with the Court 
at the forefront in defending these rights and liberties. 
                                                            
1 By judicial independence, I mean the formal legal arrangements established to ensure judicial 
autonomy, such as the constitutionalization of appointment and removal procedures and 
arrangements for the tenure security of judges. 
2 But see Moustafa (2002; 2003) for an account of a rights-activist judiciary in an authoritarian 
regime (Egypt), Hilbink (forthcoming) and Sutil (1993) for accounts of an independent but not 
rights-activist judiciary (Chile), and Shambayati (2002) for a court whose “activism is not always 
in the service of democratic consolidation and the protection of constitutional freedoms” 
(Turkey). 
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The discussion that follows demonstrates, however, that the Constitutional Court of 
Turkey was no champion of civil liberties even though it was a powerful player in national 
politics. While the Court frequently ruled against the government and took risky decisions, even 
leading to a bomb attack on the Court on one occasion, the judges rarely threw their weight 
behind expansive rulings on civil liberties. The CCT was selectively activist, protecting social 
and political members of a particular coalition but not other political groups. By the mid 1990s, it 
stood as a remarkable obstacle to a more pluralistic democracy by repeatedly closing down 
political parties that attempted to bring excluded identities, such as put forward by Kurdish or 
Islamic groups, into the Turkish political sphere. I argue that the Court’s narrow take on civil 
liberties cannot be explained by a lack of judicial independence in the formal-institutional sense 
of that term.  
The analysis here explains the Court’s narrow take on civil liberties by focusing on the 
Republican alliance that was empowered in 1960-61. This alliance included the military and 
civilian bureaucracy, the Republican People’s Party, the intelligentsia (universities, professions, 
the press), and university students. The glue of the Republican alliance was a shared Kemalist 
worldview, the ideological legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who led Turkey’s independence 
war and initiated a top-down modernization program after founding the Republic in 1923. The 
values, priorities, and interests of the Republican alliance, whose members wrote the 1961 
Constitution and established a host of counter-majoritarian institutions to lock in their power, 
were not conducive to expansive interpretations of civil liberties.3 At the doctrinal level, 
                                                            
3 Sutil makes a similar argument with respect to Chile where the judiciary and the military 
considered themselves to be civil servants and developed a strong esprit de corps, a corporate 
 8 
Kemalist secularism and nationalism excluded political projects based on religious and ethnic 
identity. At a pragmatic level, Kemalist groups depended on non-majoritarian institutions to 
preserve their political power. When civil liberties were mobilized in favor of political projects 
that challenged the hegemonic status of Kemalism, the judges saw little compelling interest for 
expansive interpretations of such liberties. Members and supporters of the populist, right-wing 
Democrat Party, which was ousted from power in the 1960 military intervention, as well as 
socialist and communist movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and Kurdish and Islamic 
movements in the 1980s and 1990s, were thus largely left without protection in their attempts to 
push the boundaries of the political system.  
In order to explain why Republican groups had such sway over the CCT, I analyze the 
constitution-making process of 1960-61 in light of Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation thesis.” 
Hirschl argues that delegating power to a high court often involves a conscious attempt by 
threatened elites to lock-in their previously acquired privileges by transforming these into rights. 
Hirschl examines how political, economic, and legal elites, who “possess disproportionate access 
to and influence upon the legal arena,” initiate a process of constitutionalization in order to 
insulate their policy preferences from democratic pressures: “[J]udicial empowerment through 
the fortification of rights may provide an efficient institutional way for hegemonic sociopolitical 
forces to preserve their hegemony and to secure their policy preferences even when majoritarian 
decision-making processes are not operating to their advantage” (Hirschl 2000: 95). Drawing on 
Hirschl, I argue that Republican groups, which lost their hegemonic status in the 1950 elections, 
played an active role in the Constitution-making process of 1960-61 and secured important 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
identity in opposition to the politicians who did not understand them, which aggravated their 
isolation from society (1993: 96). 
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enclaves of political power for themselves. The Constitutional Court was one of several non-
majoritarian institutions through which Republican groups locked in their new gains. In the next 
decades, the Court played an important role in protecting the values and interests of this coalition. 
The question remains why forty years later, the CCT continued to favor Republican 
values in its rights jurisprudence. Bottom-up perspectives in socio-legal studies show that 
organized social and political groups can influence judicial outcomes by shaping a court’s docket, 
transforming judges’ preferences on key human rights issues, and providing courts with crucial 
support when a court’s autonomy is threatened by other political actors. (Galanter 1974; Zemans 
1983; Epp 1998; Dotan 1999; Moustafa 2002; 2003, Cichowski 2001; 2004; Woods 2001). 
Recently, scholars have also shown that participating in international legal networks can 
transform the values of domestic judiciaries and provide support with decisions that are 
unpopular at home (Woods 2001; Amit 2004; Maveety and Grosskopf 2004; Scheppele 2004). 
During the period under study, the CCT was largely immune to the kinds of pressures legal 
mobilization scholars have identified. To begin with, law schools and the legal profession largely 
remained institutions of Kemalist socialization, although this is now beginning to change.4 
Second, the Turkish judiciary did not have extensive links with the international human rights 
community until quite recently. Third, although there were ways non-governmental 
organizations could indirectly participate in legal mobilization, such groups did not have direct 
access to the Court. Thus, the channels through which autonomous social groups could influence 
                                                            
4 In the universities, the Kemalist establishment has struggled to guard the gates through such 
policies as the ban on the headscarf. Within the legal profession, the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors has guarded the gates through its disciplinary powers over judges and prosecutors.  
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the Court were limited. Instead, political parties, and among them, the Republican People’s Party, 
have been the most significant “repeat players” at the CCT. 
Can we conclude, then, that the CCT ruled unfavorably on civil rights and liberties from 
1962 to date, because it was an instrument of Kemalist rule? In the last part of the article, I argue 
that there were key moments when the CCT delivered important rulings on civil rights and 
liberties. Such rulings coincided with periods when the two key pillars of the Republican alliance, 
the military and the Republican People’s Party, disagreed on important political questions. In 
other words, I show that Kemalism was not always a coherent and stable ideology, nor was the 
Republican alliance static through the decades. When groups within the Republican alliance 
disagreed with one another, particularly when the Republican People’s Party turned against the 
military and experimented with other political projects, important gains for civil rights and 
liberties were won through the CCT.  
My analysis rests on an exhaustive survey of the CCT’s 671 decisions from 1962 until 
1982 and a subset of its post-1982 decisions that involve the Kurdish and Islamic opposition 
movements. The decisions are analyzed both at an aggregate level and qualitatively. Apart from 
limitations of space, there are two reasons why the period 1962-1982 is analyzed in greater depth 
than the post-1982 period. First, while the Court’s controversial party closure decisions in the 
post-1982 period have been the subject of scholarly studies and extensive public debate in 
Turkey, relatively little is known about the Court’s pre-1982 jurisprudence beyond Turkish law 
schools.5 Second, the 1962-1982 period constitutes a tougher test of the main thesis of the article 
                                                            
5 See Arslan (2002), Shambayati (2002; 2004), and Koğacıoğlu (2003; 2004) for an analysis of 
the Court’s post-1982 jurisprudence, in particular regarding the closure of Islamist and Kurdish 
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since the 1961 Constitution contained a significantly more liberal rights regime and established a 
more autonomous and powerful judiciary than the 1982 Constitution. If judicial independence 
and judicial power were sufficient for a rights-activist judiciary, the CCT should have made 
expansive interpretations of civil rights and liberties during the 1962-1982 period.  
The rest of the article is divided into three parts and a conclusion. Part I provides the 
historical background and an analysis of how Republican groups locked in their power by 
establishing counter-majoritarian institutions through the constitutional transition of 1960-61. 
Part II contrasts the CCT’s activist rulings on matters that affected the autonomy of Republican 
groups with its more narrow jurisprudence on civil rights and liberties, demonstrating the 
selective nature of the Court’s activism. Part III focuses on key moments when the CCT 
delivered important rulings on civil rights and liberties and traces these rulings to shifts in the 
Republican alliance. In the Conclusion, I discuss the CCT’s relevance for comparative studies. 
I. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THE REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE THROUGH THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION OF 1960-61 
Turkey was ruled by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) in a single-party framework 
from its independence in 1923 until the transition to a multi-party regime during 1946-1950. 
During the twenty-seven years of RPP rule (1923-1950), there had been no meaningful 
distinction between the government and the bureaucracy, between the party and the state. Instead, 
Turkey’s founding elite established the RPP and members of the party filled both bureaucratic 
and governmental positions. Nor was there a distinction between the ideology of the party and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
political parties. For the analysis of Turkish legal scholars, see Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu (2001). 
For the 1962-1980 period, see Ünsal (1980). 
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the official ideology of the state. The Kemalist ideology of the party emphasizing top-down 
modernization, Westernization, nationalism, and secularism was also the official ideology.  
With the first free parliamentary elections in 1950, the Democrat Party (DP), which 
represented commercial and rural constituencies,6 won a sweeping majority in the parliament, 
ousting the Republicans. Democrats quickly grew hostile to the RPP and its support groups due 
to their well-founded fear that the civil and military bureaucracy continued to be loyal to the RPP 
even when the RPP was no longer in power. During their ten years in power (1950-1960), 
Democrats took increasingly repressive measures against the RPP and its support groups, the 
bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and students. For instance, DP governments passed stringent 
press laws to suppress the Republican press, sent recalcitrant civil servants (including judges and 
university professors) into early retirement, and attacked the RPP by suppressing political 
opposition (Sarıbay 1991: 126; Zürcher 1993: 241).  
Conflict between the DP and the RPP escalated in the late 1950s when DP established a 
parliamentary commission with judicial powers to investigate the “subversive” activities of RPP. 
Law professors protested this move as unconstitutional and students began demonstrations 
against the DP government. When the DP government declared martial law to quell the unrest, 
the military sided with Republican groups. On 27 May 1960, the military staged a coup and 
arrested the leaders of the DP. In the ensuing period of military rule, DP leaders were tried and 
                                                            
6 See Sunar and Sayarı (1986: 173) and Eroğul (1970: 59) for a discussion of the constituencies 
of the two parties and Frey (1965) for the backgrounds of party elites. 
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convicted for violating the constitutional order, 7  a new constitution was drafted, and a 
Constituent Assembly was established to debate and finalize the Constitution. 
The Constitution-making Process 
On the day of the coup, five law professors from Istanbul University were summoned to 
Ankara to prepare a new constitution.8 This Constitutional Commission frequently consulted 
with the National Union Committee (the military junta) during the drafting process and 
informally incorporated the views of the military into the draft. Once the draft was completed, 
law professor Turhan Feyzioğlu, who had strong Republican credentials, was appointed to chair 
a commission that would establish the election rules for the Constituent Assembly, which would 
debate and ratify the final version of the Constitution. 
Instead of a directly elected assembly composed of the representatives of political parties, 
the Feyzioğlu Commission recommended that the seats of the Constituent Assembly be divided 
with a quota system to ensure that freely elected party representatives could not constitute the 
majority of the deputies. The Assembly would include members of the National Union 
                                                            
7 The top three leaders of DP were executed. The remaining death sentences were commuted. 
Several judges and prosecutors from the ad hoc tribunal established to try DP members, 
including its chief prosecutor Salim Basol, would later serve as judges on the new Constitutional 
Court. These include Abdullah Üner (1972-1978), Hasan Gürsel (1974-1978), Nahit Saçlıoğlu 
(1978-1984), A. Fazlı Öztan (1966-1970), Kani Vrana (1970-1974), Mustafa Karaoğlu (1968-
1973), and Servet Tüzün (1981-1993) (See Sungur, 1961, for a list of the prosecuting team and 
judges who served on the ad hoc tribunal: pp. 22-23 and pp. 375-6). 
8 The chair of this commission was Sıddık Sami Onar, a law Professor from Istanbul University, 
who became a national hero when he was injured during the demonstrations against the DP. 
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Committee (the junta) and its appointees, representatives of “still operative” political parties 
(thus excluding the DP)9, elected regional representatives, and members of various professional 
organizations, most of which constituted traditional support groups of the RPP.10 Members and 
supporters of the Democrat Party were excluded from the Assembly by a law which forbid the 
election of those who, “with their activities, publications, and behavior, had supported acts in 
violation of the Constitution or of human rights before the Revolution of 27 May 1960”. As a 
result, the Constituent Assembly would be staffed by the RPP and its support groups, such as the 
army, the civilian bureaucracy, and the intelligentsia, while excluding the DP.11  
Since the DP, which represented roughly half of the Turkish population, was completely 
excluded from the Constituent Assembly, the debates in the Assembly did not reflect the main 
                                                            
9 The seats of party representatives were allocated by quota. The RPP was to have 44 members, 
while two minor parties would have 25 members each (the Republican Peasant Nation Party and 
the Nation Party), and the DP none. 
10 The members from the professional institutions would be distributed as follows: judicial 
organs (12), universities (12), the press (12), bar associations (6), teachers’ organizations (6), 
labor unions (6), veterans (2), youth (1), shop-keepers (6), chambers of commerce and industry 
(10), and agricultural associations (6) (Parla 1986: 53). With the possible exception of shop-
keepers, chambers, and agricultural associations, these institutions were likely to be dominated 
by Republican groups. 
11 According to Gençkaya, 222 among 273 members were affiliated with the RPP. According to 
Güneş-Ayata, 125 members of the Assembly were RPP-affiliated (Gençkaya 1998: 24; Güneş-
Ayata 1992: 81). See Gençkaya (1998) and Parla (1986) for a critique of the corporatist 
representation of the Assembly. 
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bones of contention in either the political spectrum or the society at large.12 The idea of a 
constitutional court with review power was not seriously challenged in the assembly. Only one 
representative, Şükûfe Ekitler, raised the counter-majoritarian difficulty, but her motion to limit 
the Court’s powers did not find resonance with any of the other members, who were convinced 
that elected representatives had to be guarded closely by an independent institution. On the 
opposite margin, Suphi Batur’s proposal that all citizens be allowed to initiate suits on basic 
rights was also defeated without difficulty. For the framers of the 1961 Constitution, the ultimate 
problem was not how to protect the citizens, but rather, how to protect Republican groups from 
elected officials.13  
The Constitutional Court and other Counter-majoritarian Institutions of the 1961 
Constitution  
The Constitutional Court was undoubtedly one of the most important institutions 
established by the 1961 Constitution. The new Court was granted constitutional review power, 
that is, the capacity to annul (declare void and strike out of existence) statutes and parliamentary 
decisions inconsistent with the Constitution, and it was provided with a high level of formal 
                                                            
12 Within Republican groups, there were disagreements between the “legalist” Istanbul group and 
the “political” Ankara group. While the Istanbul group was more elitist and anti-majoritarian 
than the Ankara group, both were significantly more anti-majoritarian than the DP. The two 
groups were roughly equally represented. See Weiker (1963: 65-72) for a more in-depth analysis 
of these groups during the drafting and ratification process. 
13 For the debates, see Kurucu Meclis, 1961. 
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independence from the political establishment.14 Appointment powers were shared between high 
judicial organs, the two houses of parliament, and the President, with the judiciary selecting 8 of 
the 15 members.15 This preference for self-selection reflected the framers’ lack of faith in 
political actors. Additional guarantees on tenure security ensured that no one could tinker with 
the independence of the Court without violating the Constitution. 
The rules determining who could refer cases to the new Court also reflected a certain bias 
in favor of Republican groups. Similar to European constitutional courts, certain political 
officials could initiate constitutional review: political parties in the National Assembly or their 
assembly groups, one-sixth of the Members of Parliament in either chamber, or the President of 
the Republic could initiate annulment suits within ninety days of the promulgation of a statute. 
                                                            
14 There is no evidence of removal or intimidation of judges in the CCT. From 1962 to date, the 
terms of 8 out of 102 judges ended before their natural retirement. Further information on the 
reason for early retirement was not available to this author. However, no judge has ever been 
officially removed or replaced and there has been no instance of court-packing. 
15 Together, the Court of Cassation, which is the final court of civil and criminal appeals, the 
Council of State, which is the final court of administrative appeals, and the Auditor General 
would elect eight of the fifteen principal members and three of the five associate members from 
among their own members, providing the higher echelons of the judicial bureaucracy with 
greater appointment powers than the elected and partisan institutions (the two houses of 
parliament and the President). In the 1982 Constitution, which reduced the number of principal 
members to eleven, high courts would retain the power to nominate candidates, but all 
appointments would be made by the President. Two candidates would be nominated by military 
courts. 
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However, while most European courts reserved the right to initiate abstract review to political 
officials, the 1961 Constitution also authorized the high appellate courts16, the High Council of 
Judges, and universities to initiate review on laws that infringed on their own autonomy. In this 
way, rules on standing provided the judiciary and universities—Republican groups—with a 
potential veto over government policy affecting their autonomy.17 
Lower courts could also refer constitutional questions to the CCT in the course of settling 
ordinary disputes (concrete review). This process, too, was borrowed from European courts. 
However, unlike some European courts, such as those in Germany and Spain, and more recently 
in Hungary and the Czech Republic, and unlike most common-law systems, individuals could 
not directly petition the Constitutional Court on matters affecting their rights. Nor did non-
governmental organizations have standing before the CCT. These rules limited the extent to 
which private citizens and civil liberties groups could activate the Court as “repeat players.” 
The CCT was only one of the many counter-majoritarian institutions established by the 
1961 Constitution. In addition, the power and autonomy of the Council of State, a high 
administrative court with administrative review power, was increased. A National Security 
Council with advisory power18, a State Planning Organization to steer industrial policy, a High 
Council of Judges responsible for appointments and personnel affairs of the judiciary, and an 
elite upper chamber, were established as further checks on elected majorities. Thus, the 1961 
constitution delegated major policy-making powers to the bureaucracy (to senior judges, military 
                                                            
16 The Court of Cassation, the Council of State, the Military Court of Cassation. 
17 These groups would lose this power and minor political parties would be prevented from 
petitioning the Court in the 1982 Constitution. 
18 The National Security Council’s powers would be expanded in the 1982 Constitution. 
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officials, and technocrats) as well as increasing the bureaucracy’s supervisory role over 
politicians, empowering Republican strongholds vis-à-vis those elected institutions more likely 
to be controlled by the populist right-wing governments in the tradition of DP. Moreover, the 
autonomy of the judiciary, the universities, and the press was expanded and placed under 
constitutional protection as further checks against government power.  
In sum, the 1961 Constitution reflected the fears of Republican groups from elected 
majorities. The experience of the 1950s, in which the RPP lost every single election to the DP, 
taught the Republicans that they had little chance of remaining in power under a majoritarian 
system. The separation-of-powers system embraced in the 1961 Constitution therefore 
empowered bureaucratic enclaves against elected governments. The electoral system was 
simultaneously changed from an extreme version of the plurality system to an extreme version of 
the proportional representation system, further eroding the prospective power of elected officials 
and making it very hard for the latter to amend the Constitution.  
This analysis of the critical juncture of 1960-61 lends support to Hirschl’s “hegemonic 
preservation thesis” that delegating power to a high court often involves a conscious attempt by 
threatened elites to lock-in their previously acquired privileges by transforming these into rights. 
Republican groups lost their privileged status with DP’s electoral victory after the transition to 
democracy in 1950. DP’s repressive policies toward (Republican) opposition groups provided 
the grounds for the military intervention of 1960. In the ensuing period, Republican groups wrote 
a new constitution which would minimize the future power of elected majorities through a 
rigorous system of checks and balances. Thus, although the adoption of the new constitution and 
the establishment of the CCT reflected a reaction to the authoritarian majoritarianism of the 
Democrat Party, these moves toward constitutional democracy and the rule of law were not 
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neutral in terms of substantial political values. In other words, the CCT was not established as an 
impartial referee of a contract between Republicans and Democrats, but as the guardian of a 
Republican Constitution against Democrats. As Shambayati argues, a constitutional structure 
bifurcated between elected institutions and unelected ones would facilitate the judicialization of 
politics in Turkey, but such judicialization would not always be in the service of democracy or 
human rights (2002). 
II. A PATTERN OF SELECTIVE ACTIVISM 
Aggregate Data 
We begin our analysis of the CCT with aggregate data on its caseload and on its decisions 
of annulment (findings of unconstitutionality). Data is reported for the years 1962-1999.19 
Aggregate data on the rulings of the CCT from 1962 to 1999 reveal several trends. First, since its 
inception, both the caseload of the Court and the rate of annulments have been relatively high in 
comparative terms.20 Only during the period of military rule in 1980-1983 did the Court’s 
                                                            
19 The Court began functioning in 1962. 1999 was taken as a cut-off date because major 
constitutional transformations have occurred through the Europeanization process since 1999. 
20 For instance, constitutional courts in the Czech Republic, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Russia, Moldova, and Slovakia decided a total of 10, 11, 13, 19, 41, 59, 74, and 96 cases, 
respectively, in their first three years of operation (Smithey and Ishiyama 2002: 723) while the 
CCT decided a total of 119 cases in its first 3 years. The French Constitutional Council received 
9 referrals in its first 15 years (Provine 1996: 191) and the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany heard a total of 112 challenges through abstract review and 2,612 cases through 
concrete review from 1950 until 1991 (Blankenburg 1996: 309). The CCT also appears as a 
relatively activist court in terms of its annulment rates. Until 1985, the Japanese Supreme Court 
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activity come to a standstill. Apart from the 1980-1983 period, however, there is no evidence in 
aggregate data that the CCT functioned as rubber-stamp for the other branches. By most 
standards of court power or activism in the literature, the CCT figures as a powerful court.21 
______________________________ 
  
Figure 1 about here 
______________________________ 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
found only 3 laws unconstitutional (Sanders 1996: 327). From 1983 until 1997, Argentina’s 
Supreme Court found 26% of the norms unconstitutional (Molinelli 1999; cited in Iaryczower 
2002: 703), compared with CCT’s 46% for 1962-1982. CCT’s annulment rates in abstract review 
are even higher: 65% (1962-1982) and 82% (1983-1999), while these rates are 54% since 1981 
in France (Stone Sweet 2000: 63), 53% since 1991 in Germany (Stone Sweet 2000: 64), 52% 
during 1981-1990 in Spain (Stone Sweet 2000: 64). 
21 See Tate (1995: 33), Holland (1991: 1), and Smithey and Ishiyama (2002: 721-722) for 
definitions of “judicial activism” which focus on the policy-making role of courts, their caseload, 
and the number of rulings against the government (in the form of annulments of unconstitutional 
statutes). Smithey and Ishiyama hold that “In general, courts that decide more cases, across a 
greater range of issues, should be considered more activist than those that decide a smaller 
number of cases across a narrower range of subjects... Nullification is ... considered the highest 
form of activism by most commentators” (2002: 720-21). Ginsburg similarly develops the 
concept of a “high equilibrium” court as one which frequently rules against the government, has 
a heavy caseload, and high levels of compliance with its decisions (Ginsburg 2003: 73). The 
annulment rates and caseload that I report capture two of these three indicators of Ginsburg’s 
“high equilibrium court” and of Smithey and Ishiyama’s “activist court”. 
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At first look, aggregate data on CCT’s rulings support two central assumptions of the 
literature on judicial power and judicial independence. First, the data reveal an evolutionary 
trend, especially since the end of military rule in 1983, of a gradually expanding docket and 
successively more activist rulings. These data support the arguments advanced by Stone Sweet 
(2000: 55) and Ginsburg (2003: 66-77) that “judicialization” is a potentially irreversible, self-
reinforcing process. Second, the sharp drop in both caseload and number of annulments during 
the period of military rule (1980-1983) confirms the view that democracy and judicial 
independence are crucial for judicial activism (Holland 1991; Tate 1995). 
Three further findings complicate this picture, however. First, it is puzzling that the 
Court’s level of activism was not affected negatively by the indirect military intervention of 
1971-3, when a militarily-imposed cabinet declared martial law and ruled the country under the 
threat of military take-over. Indeed, during this period of indirect military rule, the rate of 
annulments increased from 33% in 1970 to 50% (1971) and to 64% (1972). Thus, while 
aggregate data on the period 1980-1983 confirm the significance of judicial independence and 
democracy for judicial activism, data on the period 1971-1973 leave a puzzle to be explained.  
Second, although the fall in annulments and in caseload coincide with the year of the 
military coup (1980), as we will see below in a qualitative analysis of the data, the fall in 
activism regarding civil rights and liberties began in 1978, two years before the military take-
over (See also Table 1 below). I suggest that the CCT’s decreasing activism on rights questions 
coincided with the RPP’s abandonment of the rights agenda and was not due to direct pressures 
on the Court from the military. This is not to deny the role of the military in Turkish politics, but 
to draw attention to the ways in which other actors were also consequential. 
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Third, a qualitative analysis of decisions in two issue areas reveals a deeper trend about 
activism that begs explanation. As I show below, activism has consistently been selective 
regardless of the ups and downs caused by military interventions. While the CCT has been very 
activist in protecting the autonomy of Republican groups, such as civil servants, the judiciary, 
and universities, it has, with few exceptions, been quite conservative on civil liberties, such as 
the freedom of expression, assembly, and association. For a better interpretation of aggregate 
data, we thus need a closer look at the content of the decisions. Such an analysis, which I 
undertake below, challenges the evolutionary perspective linking the expansion of rights to the 
gradual expansion of judicial power. 
Protecting the Autonomy of the Republican Alliance 
As a reaction to the DP’s attack on the civil service during the 1950s, the 1961 
Constitution included a provision stating that all administrative acts would be subject to judicial 
review. One of the first tasks of the newly established CCT was to give life to this provision by 
striking down DP-era legislation on the disciplinary powers of the executive over civil servants, 
state employees, and the professions. Through a series of decisions in 1963, the justices 
transferred the ultimate decision-making power over the career paths of these groups from the 
executive to the administrative judiciary. In doing so, they simultaneously increased the power of 
the judicial branch over the other branches and protected their allies from hostile politicians. 
Disciplinary actions over lawyers (K.1963/129)22, judges (K.1963/291), government 
attorneys (K.1965/02), salaried personnel in state owned enterprises (K.1962/86), civil servants 
                                                            
22 Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Turkey are available in Turkish at the Court’s official 
website at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/GERKARANA.htm. In the text, I list the 
decision number (Karar No.) for each case, which consists of the abbreviation “K.” for 
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pensioned-off against their will (K.1963/21), and members of professional associations and 
chambers (K.1963/190) were subjected to judicial oversight through a series of similar decisions. 
In these cases, the justices acted with great confidence: “The unconstitutionality of the said 
provision is clear in a way that leaves no room for doubt, discussion, or even the need for lengthy 
explanations” (K.1963/115). These decisions established checks on the hiring and firing capacity 
as well as the disciplinary power of elected officials over the bureaucracy, by empowering the 
Council of State23 to supervise the legality of such decisions. As DP attacked the civil service in 
the 1950s, its successor Justice Party (JP) would attack the civil service in the 1970s and the 
careers of civil servants and state employees would polarize the JP and RPP. During these years, 
the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, and the RPP acted jointly to protect the salaries, 
pension benefits and tenure security of civil servants and state employees, causing great 
annoyance to Justice Party governments. As Levi states, “Completely unable to get along with 
[the Council of State], the JP government resorted to subterfuge, like refusing to accept letters 
sent by it.” (Levi 1990: 146) 
 A second area that triggered systematic annulment decisions from the Court during the 
1960s and 1970s was the autonomy of the judiciary. The 1961 Constitution provided strong 
guarantees for the independence and autonomy of the judiciary, once again, as a reaction to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
“Decision No,” followed by the year in which the decision was rendered, and the number of that 
decision within that year. Decisions on political party dissolution are identified separately as 
party closure decisions. For a full citation, which includes application year and number (Esas 
No.), decision year and number (Karar No.), and the date the decision was rendered, please refer 
to the list at the end of the article.  
23 The administrative high court. 
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interference of DP governments with the judiciary during the 1950s. The CCT consolidated and 
expanded these guarantees during the 1960s and delivered more controversial rulings during the 
1970s. Contested issues included the powers of the Ministry of Justice over the personnel affairs 
of the judiciary, over their appointment, removal, and relocation, as well as the status of 
prosecutors.24 The Court effectively minimized the power of the Ministry of Justice over the 
judiciary while extending to prosecutors some of the protections afforded to judges, expanding 
the autonomy and corporate nature of the legal profession. These early cases were followed by 
bold rulings during the 1970s when judicial autonomy was attacked by the martial-law era 
cabinets of 1971-1973 and by JP governments thereafter. In a landmark ruling in 1977, the CCT 
struck down a constitutional amendment of the military-imposed cabinet of 1971-3, which 
exempted disciplinary decisions over judges from further judicial review (K.1977/04; 
K.1977/117). This same cabinet had passed another amendment explicitly prohibiting the Court 
from reviewing the substantial constitutionality of constitutional amendments. The justices, 
however, made a round-about argument that they were engaged in procedural review, for which 
they had to interpret the government’s attempt to dilute judicial autonomy as amounting to a 
regime change.25 This broad interpretation demonstrates how closely the judges identified the 
                                                            
24 These were: K. 1963/270; K.1963/111; K.1963/291; K. 1963/112; K. 1964/38; K. 1966/40; K. 
1966/44; K. 1966/47; K. 1967/45; K.1969/31; K.1969/38; K.1971/44. The Court rejected two 
cases on procedural grounds, because the disputed law had already been amended (K.1963/162; 
K.1963/172). 
25 The judges argued that the amendment violated Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibited 
amending articles on the Republican nature of the regime. The attempt to dilute judicial 
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regime’s nature with their own professional autonomy. Orhan Aldikacti, a conservative law 
professor who would author Turkey’s illiberal 1982 Constitution, criticized these decisions with 
the following words:  
 
[W]hen [the Court] declared in a decision that it had the authority to review constitutional amendments, law 1488 
has been passed to establish that amendments can be reviewed only procedurally, that is to say, not substantively. 
Yet the Constitutional Court has continued to review amendments substantively in an indirect way, by giving new 
meaning to article 9... It will be very instructive to study the history of the American Supreme Court here. After 
attempting to obstruct the executive, the judicial power [in the U.S.] has understood that its real function is not to 
stay opposite the executive, but rather to stay next to it, and to aid it in disposing of its functions in harmony with 
the Constitution and the laws (Aldıkaçtı 1980: 18). 
 
The CCT’s rulings on constitutional amendments were also the most controversial from a legal 
stand point. Indeed, the justices were willing to eschew their positivism when the stakes were 
high. As in the cases on civil service, the CCT’s decisions protecting judicial autonomy helped to 
entrench the members of the Republican alliance within state organizations in the face of hostile 
opposition from JP governments. As we will see below, such creative and bold rulings were 
rarely made in the name of protecting civil liberties. 
A third area for court activism was the autonomy of universities. In the early, low-profile 
cases on personnel affairs,26 the judges struck the provisions infringing on the autonomy of 
universities with characteristic confidence: “Yet this is nothing but a softened and slightly 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
autonomy was interpreted as an attempt to change the Republican form of government. This 
interpretation allowed the judges to claim that they had exercised procedural review.  
26 K.1971/05; K.1971/82; K.1972/62; K.1974/04 
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concealed version of a provision that would allow certain persons [from the political 
establishment] to directly influence who can be a professor, a Ph.D., an assistant” (K. 1971/05). 
During the 1970s, when universities became centers of student activism and began challenging 
government authority directly, the Court protected universities from counter-attack by right-wing 
governments. Even though the martial-law era cabinet had considerably diluted constitutional 
provisions on university autonomy, the CCT continued to subscribe to high standards of 
autonomy, disregarding “legislative intent” in this area with its 1974 decision on the new 
University Personnel Law (1974/04). A year later, the CCT struck down another martial-law-era 
legislation on universities.27 The new University Law, which attempted to bring the universities 
under tight government control, would give the government wide powers over the curriculum 
and the fate of instructors, research assistants, and students. It would facilitate prosecution of 
university staff and authorize arbitrary police action within universities. In one of their longest 
sessions lasting five days, the justices struck down nearly two-thirds of this repressive law. As in 
civil service cases and judicial autonomy cases, the justices protected their allies in universities 
from the arbitrary action of authoritarian politicians. 
Finally, the CCT defended civil servants and state employees not only from the executive 
but also from disaffected citizens. An Ottoman-era law protected civil servants from prosecution 
initiated by citizens, by requiring citizens to first obtain permission from the administration to 
initiate a criminal suit against an abusive civil servant. According to this law, although citizens 
could lodge complaints about abusive civil servants, it was up to the administration to decide 
whether the complaint merited a judicial hearing. The law was a major barrier for the right to an 
effective remedy as it allowed the administration to protect abusive civil servants and state 
                                                            
27 K.1975/25; K.1975/22; K.1975/23; K.1975/24. 
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employees. From 1962 until 2000, the Law on the Trial of Civil Servants was referred sixteen 
times to the CCT for annulment. Cases included public school teachers (K.1970/44; K.1992/12; 
K.1992/46), village-headmen (K.1965/06; K.1967/36), gendarmerie (K.1963/88; K.1968/35), 
and other public officials (K.1965/53), who engaged in abusive practices towards local citizens 
(beating, threatening to use their guns in personal disputes, etc.) or caused harm to citizens by 
their negligence (K.1991/10; K.1992/13; K.1992/31). Until a partial annulment in 1992 
(K.1992/11), which at least allowed citizens to appeal a “decision not to prosecute,” the CCT 
rejected all of these petitions, procedurally or in their substance. In these decisions, too, the 
Court defended civil servants and provided them with security and permanence within positions 
of power, even when they had demonstrably abused that power. The CCT’s jurisprudence on this 
law illustrates the Court’s priorities when weighing the security and power of Republican groups 
with the rights of citizens to an effective remedy from abusive state employees. 
As the preceding cases show, the CCT was highly active in defending the autonomy of 
judges, prosecutors, university professors, civil servants, and the professions from governments 
and even from citizens. It systematically annulled legislation tinkering with the autonomy of 
Republican groups in public institutions. Furthermore, in these decisions, the justices 
occasionally eschewed their positivist attitude in favor of creative, controversial, and bold rulings. 
The CCT’s decisions secured the permanence of Republican groups within public institutions 
against threats from elected officials. To be sure, these decisions contributed to the rule-of-law 
by limiting the discretionary authority of the executive and legislative. The concept of “the rule 
of law”, however, was colored by a peculiarly Republican understanding of what was arbitrary 
and what was lawful. It meant that Justice Party officials could not remove or discipline 
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Republican civil servants. The justices’ activism in this sphere, however, contrasted sharply with 
their take on civil rights and liberties, to which I now turn. 
Civil Rights and Liberties 
In civil liberties cases, the Court adopted a conservative and restrictive stance, in sharp 
contrast to its rulings on the autonomy of Republican groups. While the CCT struck down at 
least one provision of 73% of the laws referred to the Court on the autonomy of Republican 
groups, it struck down only 34% of the laws involving civil rights and liberties (see Table 1) 
When liberty was demanded by socialists, communists, and Democrat Party members in the 
1960s and 1970s, by Islamist and Kurdish activists in the 1980s and 1990s, the justices, almost 
always came down on the side of “public order and security”, consolidating the status of 
Kemalism as the only permissible political ideology. Furthermore, the judges were not as willing 
to eschew formalism and make creative or natural law arguments to protect civil liberties.  
______________________________ 
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Before surveying civil liberties cases, it is worth briefly exploring the constitutional basis 
for the Court’s rulings. Until the amendments of 1971, the 1961 Constitution established an ideal 
basis for expansive rulings on civil liberties. After listing a full bill of rights, it stated that “The 
restrictions on the exercise of rights, to be prescribed by law, cannot infringe on the substance of 
that right, even if for such reasons as the public interest, general morality, public order, social 
justice, or national security.” (1961 Turkish Const. art. 11) This provision gave enormous 
discretion to judges to legitimize expansive rulings on civil rights. In a complete round-about, 
this article was amended in 1971 to facilitate restrictions on rights: 
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Basic rights and liberties can be restricted by law for the purpose of providing the unity of the state with its nation 
and territory, for the protection of the Republic, national security, public order, public interest, general morality and 
public health, or for specific reasons specified in other articles of the Constitution, provided such restrictions are not 
contrary to the word and spirit of the Constitution  
 
More restrictions were introduced through the illiberal 1982 Constitution. However, as we will 
see below, the text of the Constitution was not determinative of the Court’s level of activism. 
Indeed, during the 1960s, the judges did not take advantage of the liberal basis of Article 11 to 
expand civil liberties. They adopted a dry, positivist, and narrow jurisprudence even when 
human rights arguments were raised by the petitioners. Furthermore, the more important rulings 
for civil rights and liberties came during the 1970s, despite a much less convenient textual basis. 
In fact, the Court annulled 68% of the twenty-six laws restricting civil rights and liberties that 
were referred to the Court during the 1970s (See Table 1) and the Court’s activism on rights 
questions reached a peak when both the government and the Constitution were hostile to civil 
rights and liberties. In Part III, I show that the CCT’s expansive rulings reflected changes in 
alliance relationships. Specifically, I claim that a temporary rift between the military and the 
Republican People’s Party accounts for the CCT’s expansive rulings in the 1970s.  
Civil Rights and Liberties during the 1960s 
The first important test of how far the judges were willing to go in protecting the freedom 
of expression came with the referral by three courts of a 1962 statute that prohibited criticizing 
the 1960 military coup (K.1963/83). The lower courts were hearing cases on speeches or 
newspaper articles critical of the “27 May Revolution,” i.e., the 1960 intervention. In one of 
them, an influential former Democrat Party member had said in response to a journalist that an 
amnesty for former Democrat Party members (a hotly debated issue at the time in the National 
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Assembly) would be restitution rather than an act of pardoning. He was charged with violating 
the Constitution. When the case came to the CCT, the judges held that permitting the expression 
of opinions critical of the trial of the old regime would mean endorsing the actions that led to the 
breakdown of the constitutional order in 1960. According to the judges, allowing such criticism 
would divide the citizens, thereby causing a danger to public order. Here, the judges did not 
introduce criteria to test whether an actual threat to public order existed. Rather, they presumed 
that allowing criticism of Kemalism would bring anarchy.  
The CCT was also conservative when freedom of speech was evoked by the socialist 
Workers Party of Turkey in 1964 (K.1964/09). WPT challenged Article 312 of the Criminal 
Code on incitement to hatred, which has been utilized to crack down on socialist, Islamist, and 
Kurdish activists over the past four decades for their political views, even when these groups 
expressed their views non-violently. During the late 1990s, Article 312 also formed the basis of 
countless petitions to the European Court of Human Rights. Successive ECHR decisions on 
violation of the freedom of expression eventually forced the legislature to amend the article, but 
the CCT did not find Article 312 unconstitutional. 
Throughout the 1960s, the CCT handed down conservative rulings on freedom of 
expression and association when the exercise of these involved foreign connections. For instance, 
while the Constitution stipulated that everyone has the right to form associations without prior 
permission, Article 143 of the Criminal Code required individuals to receive permission from the 
Council of Ministers in order to become a member of an international association or to set up 
branches of a foreign-based association. This article was challenged by the Justice Party and the 
Workers’ Party of Turkey (K.1964/08; K.1964/09). The CCT rejected both petitions, evoking the 
general morality and public order restriction. The judges argued that activities dangerous for 
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public order within the country would easily spread if associations with international connections 
could be established without prior permission. 
A similar provision of the Law on Associations was referred the next year by the socialist 
Workers’ Party of Turkey. The CCT replied: 
Today, there are innumerable associations around the world. Many of these can be very dangerous for our country. 
For instance, the activities of associations established abroad to spread certain harmful ideologies incompatible with 
the principles of our Constitution can bring us more harm than good (K.1965/16). 
The judges also upheld Article 6 of the police law, which required police permission for 
broadcasting films imported from abroad (K.1963/179); Article 31 of the press law, which gave 
the Council of Ministers the power to prohibit the entry of foreign publications into Turkey 
(K.1963/178); and Article 22 of the passport law, which prevented certain persons from 
receiving passports on political grounds (K.1963/100). In these cases, the judges presumed a 
prima facie connection between foreign affiliations and a threat to public order that justified for 
them the prior restrictions and prohibitions, and gave civil liberties a narrow reading when 
weighing these against presumed threats to public order. In sum, throughout the 1960s, the CCT 
delivered narrow rulings on civil liberties even though article 11 of the Constitution provided a 
basis for expansive interpretations. 
Civil Rights and Liberties during the 1990s 
This conservative, non-activist stance of the Court in civil liberties cases continued well 
into the 1990s. A new anti-terror law replaced the older laws criminalizing various forms of 
speech and association in 1991.28 Like the Criminal Code articles that preceded it, the anti-terror 
                                                            
28 Articles 140, 141, 142, which criminalized communist propaganda and established the basis of 
mass arrests during 1971-73 and 1978-82 were repealed with the entry into force of the 1991 
anti-terror law (law 3713, adopted 12.04.1991) 
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law defined terrorism broadly. Thus, various forms of political activity, including supporting a 
federal solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question, could be prosecuted as terrorism. Article 8 of the 
1991 anti-terror law, along with Article 312 of the Criminal Code, have been the subject of 
numerous ECHR cases on Turkey, in which the ECHR judges stated time and again that freedom 
of expression also includes the freedom to express “ideas that shock, offend, and disturb the state 
or any sector of the population” and held tests of “pressing social need” to establish restrictions 
on civil rights and liberties.29 The CCT, however, found Article 312 constitutional in 1964 and 
the Anti-Terror Law’s definition of terrorism constitutional in 1992 (K.1992/20). 
During the 1990s, the CCT also interpreted expressions of religiosity in public 
institutions as a threat to the constitutional order. The CCT blocked two legislative attempts that 
would permit observant female students to wear the Muslim headscarf in public universities. The 
Court claimed that this would violate the secular principle of separating religion from state and 
might disturb “the unity of the state and the nation, public order, and public security” by 
provoking differences of opinion and religious affiliation among young people (K.1989/12; 
                                                            
29 In 1998, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found two violations of the freedom of 
expression arising from article 312 of the Criminal Code on incitement to hatred: Zana v. Turkey 
(Judgment on 25.11.1997) and Incal v. Turkey (Judgment on 09.06.1998). In a landmark ruling 
in July 1999, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR found thirteen violations arising from either 
article 312 or the anti-terror law: Arslan v. Turkey; Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey; Ceylan v. 
Turkey; Gerger v. Turkey; Polat v. Turkey; Karataş v. Turkey; Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey; 
Okçuoğlu v Turkey; Sürek and Özdemir; Sürek v. Turkey (no.1); Sürek v. Turkey (no.3); Sürek v. 
Turkey (no.4); Öztürk v. Turkey (Judgment on 08.07.1999). The decisions of the ECHR are 
available at the ECHR’s official website www.echr.coe.int.  
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K.1991/08).30 In other instances, however, separating state from religion did not lead the CCT to 
exempt individuals from the obligation to state a religion on their identity cards (K.1979/44; 
K.1995/16). In other words, the justices interpreted freedom of expression narrowly while 
interpreting “separation of state and religion” through a Kemalist, anti-religious lens. 
The most controversial rulings of the CCT during the 1990s were in the area of party 
closures.31 From 1983 until 1999, the Court banned two parties that supported Islamic politics 
and initiated proceedings on a third (Dissolution of Political Party Cases K.1983/02; K.1998/01; 
K.2001/02) and it banned ten small political parties that supported Kurdish autonomy or called 
for an open debate of the Kurdish question.32 These pro-Kurdish parties were closed for 
“attempting to divide the unity of the state and the nation on a race-based distinction between 
Turks and Kurds.” Rather than protecting the expression of Kurdish identity, the Court 
                                                            
30 The first case was referred by General Kenan Evren (who established himself as the President 
of the Republic after presiding military rule during 1980-1983), and the second case was referred 
by the Social Democratic Left Party (SDLP), the party for Republicans after the 1980 coup. 
31 See Arslan (2002), Shambayati (2002; 2004), and Koğacıoğlu (2003; 2004) for more in-depth 
analyses of the Court’s party closure decisions. 
32 The Turkish United Communist Party was closed down on 16.07.1991 for supporting 
separatism and class domination (K.1991/01). Other parties banned for separatism until 1999 are: 
Socialist Party (K.1992/01); People’s Labor Party (K.1993/01); Freedom and Democracy Party 
(K.1993/02); Socialist Party of Turkey (K.1993/03); Democracy Party (K.1994/02); Socialist 
Union Party (K.1995/01); Party for Democracy and Change (K.1996/01); Labor Party (K. 
1997/01); Democratic Mass Party (K.1999/01).  These decisions are listed under “Dissolution of 
Political Parties” at the end of the article. 
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criminalized it as a race-based attempt to divide the state. The CCT argued that “In democratic 
societies, the real criterion for basic rights and liberties is the individual. There cannot be a basis 
for transforming this into a national right and liberty for minorities to divide the nation, territory 
or the state” (Dissolution of Political Party Case, K.1993/03). The CCT also approved, in 1994, 
of the lifting of immunity of several Kurdish Members of Parliament who took the parliamentary 
oath in the Kurdish language, wearing Kurdish national colors.33 As Koğacıoğlu argues, the 
expression of religious and ethnic identity were permissible only if they were not overtly 
politicized (2004).  
In sum, the CCT took a conservative stance on the freedom to express “shocking” 
opinions, even though it had enough clout to challenge the government. Political ideologies 
critical of Kemalism received no protection from the CCT. The justices adopted this stance very 
early on in the 1960s, even before street violence between the left and right in the 1970s or the 
Kurdish uprising after 1980s fortified the presumed link between non-Kemalist ideologies and 
threats to public order and security. This persistently conservative stance on civil rights and 
liberties distinguishes the Constitutional Court of Turkey from high courts that played leadership 
roles in human rights and democratization, such as those in Germany, Hungary, South Africa, 
and India. 
III. SHIFTS IN THE REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE 
The preceding section underlined the contrast between the Court’s approach to the 
autonomy of the Republican alliance with its approach to civil rights and liberties in order to 
demonstrate that judicial power and independence do not automatically lead to activism by 
                                                            
33 After their immunity was lifted, these MPs were tried in state security courts and received 
sentences of up to fifteen years. 
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courts on rights questions. I argued, rather, that courts’ implicit alliances shape the values and 
groups they protect, leading to a selective activism, and that in Turkey’s case, the initial 
parameters of this alliance were set during the constitutional transition of 1960-61 when 
Republican groups established counter-majoritarian institutions to insulate themselves from 
democratic pressures. This section concentrates on changes over time in the Court’s approach to 
civil rights and liberties, to identify how shifts in alliances affected the values and groups that 
received the Court’s protection.  
I note two key periods in which shifts within the Republican alliance resulted in 
expansive rulings by the Court on rights questions. First, I argue that after the military 
memorandum of 1971, the short-lived rift within the Republican alliance between the military 
and the Republican People’s Party accounts for the Court’s landmark decisions on civil rights 
and liberties during the 1970s. A significant number of these rulings were in response to RPP 
petitions, which had now shifted to the left. However, the RPP abandoned its commitment to the 
rights agenda when the Ecevit government declared martial law in 1978, after failing to contain 
civil violence through constitutional means. Table 1 and 2 show that the CCT’s activism on 
rights questions came to a halt simultaneously, although lower courts continued to refer rights 
questions to the Court. Thus, the RPP’s ideological shifts were crucial for the rights-
jurisprudence of the CCT. Second, when left-wing groups among Republicans briefly challenged 
official policies towards the Kurdish regions of Turkey in the early 1990s, important gains for 
civil rights and liberties were won through the CCT on this most unlikely area. This experiment 
did not last very long, either, however, and the Republicans abandoned the Kurdish cause, 
increasingly becoming an anti-Islamist, single-issue party from the mid-1990s on. With the rise 
 36 
of Islamist political parties in Turkey, the worldviews of the military, the SDLP-RPP, and the 
CCT gradually converged again during the course of the 1990s and 2000s.  
______________________________ 
  
Table 2 about here 
______________________________ 
 
The 1971 Memorandum and the Shift to the Left 
During the late 1960s, the emergence of a vibrant left-wing movement in Turkey 
(Zurcher 1993: 253-291; Ahmad 1993: 120-180) pressured the existing political parties to 
reformulate their positions along a left-right axis (Tachau 1984). The RPP began to take a mildly 
left-wing stance with the adoption of the “left-of-center” slogan in the 1965 elections while also 
cautiously distancing itself from communism and socialism. This mild move, however, was 
highly contentious within the party. Forty-eight members rejected this turn in 1967 and left the 
RPP to establish the Reliance Party to better preserve what they believed were the core values of 
the RPP.34  The RPP moved further left after a leadership change following the military 
memorandum in 1971. Meanwhile, the Justice Party made anti-communism one of its central 
tenets and began to use the anti-communism banner as a way to appeal to the support of the 
military and of ultranationalist groups against the RPP and its support groups. Thus, the 
emergence of the left-wing movement destabilized the Republican alliance and its ideology of 
Kemalism.   
In the late 1960s, a combination of political violence by student groups, assassinations, 
trade union activism, and political fragmentation provided the military with the opportunity to 
                                                            
34 The dissidents were led by Turhan Feyzioğlu, who had been one of the architects of the 1961 
Constitution, and a key personality in the party. 
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reassert itself. On 12 March 1971, the commanders of the armed forces issued a memorandum, 
accusing the Justice Party government of driving the country into “anarchy, fratricidal strife, and 
social and economic unrest,” calling for the establishment of “a powerful and credible 
government … which will end the present anarchic situation … and will implement reformist 
laws,” threatening to carry out “the duty which is given to them by law to protect and preserve 
the Turkish Republic … directly” otherwise (Hale 1994: 184-5). The threat notwithstanding, the 
military did not seize power, but ruled indirectly through a civilian emergency cabinet. 
At the outset, it was not clear whether the intervention was for or against the right or the 
left. Indeed, it appears in retrospect that different factions had different projects in mind, as the 
armed forces, like all public institutions during this period, was divided between left and right 
factions. When the memorandum was issued, the incumbent right-wing Justice Party government 
resigned and the generals installed a new cabinet, to be led by Nihat Erim, a member of the right-
faction of the RPP. Erim established a “technocrat-government” with individuals largely drawn 
from outside the parliament. Soon, however, the intervention took a decidedly anti-left direction. 
Martial-law was declared in eleven provinces and the armed forces began a witch hunt for left-
wing activists, including trade union members, teachers, and professors. The socialist Workers’ 
Party of Turkey was closed down along with the Islamist National Order Party while members of 
ultranationalist right-wing militias were left alone. The intervention was now clearly against left-
wing groups.  
The RPP was divided over how to react to these developments. When party leader İnönü 
cautiously announced his support for the military-supported Erim government, Ecevit, the 
emerging leader of the left-faction of the RPP, resigned from his post as secretary-general. 
Ecevit’s resignation was followed by a great deal of commotion and soul-searching within the 
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RPP. Party leader İnönü announced that “left of center” could not be interpreted contrarily to the 
tenets of Kemalism and that RPP could not embrace socialism because socialism was contrary to 
RPP’s core principle of nationalism.35 Others accused Ecevit of turning the RPP into a class 
party. 36  RPP never completely resolved the doctrinal debate on the boundaries between 
Kemalism and socialism, but Ecevit won the party chairmanship from İnönü at a party 
conference in May 1972, and thereafter, the party took an active stance against the 1971 
intervention.  
Meanwhile, military backed governments amended over forty articles of the 1961 
Constitution. The amendments included restrictions on all civil rights and liberties and a frontal 
attack on the autonomy of institutions protected by the 1961 Constitution. In September 1971, 
civil servants were prohibited from becoming members of trade unions (article 119); the 
autonomy of universities (article 120), radio and television (article 121), the prosecutor’s office 
(article 137), and the High Council of Judges (article 143 & 144) was curtailed. In 1973, 
provisions were made for the establishment of State Security Courts to try crimes against the 
state. These courts were to be staffed by military judges alongside civilian judges (article 136). 
The CCT and the Council of State did not escape the crack-down on the institutions set up with 
the 1961 Constitution. A new clause, stating “Judicial power cannot be exercised in a manner 
that limits the lawful exercise of the executive function. Judicial decisions cannot have the nature 
of administrative acts and actions” invited the Court and its junior partner, the Council of State, 
to begin exercising restraint (article 114). Another amendment prohibited the CCT from 
                                                            
35 See Cumhuriyet daily, January 24, 1972. 
36 Retired Admiral and RPP member Orkunt criticized Ecevit on this count. See Cumhuriyet 
daily, February 7, 1972. 
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reviewing constitutional amendments except in their procedural validity (article 147). Meanwhile, 
the right to petition the Court was slightly narrowed (article 149), to block minor parties such as 
the socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey, which had consistently flooded the Court’s docket with 
civil rights questions from 1962 until the party’s closure during martial-law.  
While the arrest of many left-wing activists by martial-law authorities antagonized the 
left, the constitutional amendments also antagonized many Republicans with moderate left-wing 
sympathies, since these developments rejected the legacy of the 1960 “Revolution” dear to many 
Republicans. As a result, for a brief period in Turkish history, the cause of the left was joined 
with the cause of the Republicans. During the 1970s, as right-wing governments routinely 
violated civil rights and liberties in their attack against left-wing groups, Republican institutions, 
such as the CCT and the Council of State tried to protect these rights and liberties. The close 
relations between the Republican People’s Party, the Council of State, and the CCT were 
particularly significant for important civil liberties rulings during this period. 
CCT rulings through the 1970s 
The CCT delivered its boldest decisions after the period of indirect military rule (1971-
1973). During the 1970s, the Court struck down several constitutional amendments with the 
argument that these amounted to transforming the Republican nature of the regime, delivered its 
most expansive interpretations of civil rights and liberties, and made its politically most risky 
decisions, challenging both the right-wing governments of the day and the military. Furthermore, 
the Court occasionally extended protection to left-wing groups and it prevented the militarization 
of the criminal justice system. 
How did CCT rulings affect left-wing movement? For instance, the CCT made a 
procedural argument to prevent the execution of three student activists, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf 
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Aslan, and Huseyin İnan, who modeled themselves after Che Guvara and who were icons of the 
Turkish revolutionary youth movement (K.1972/18). Since the annulment was only procedural, 
however, the government re-authorized the executions and the CCT was ultimately unable to 
prevent them. At another instance, in a series of rulings, the CCT expanded the scope of the 
RPP-enacted amnesty law, to cover a broader set of political prisoners who had been 
incarcerated during the period of mass arrests in the martial-law era. Through a procedural 
argument, the CCT extended the amnesty to individuals convicted of setting up socialist 
organizations or engaging in socialist propaganda,37 of attempting to overhaul the constitutional 
order,38 and of arming the population against the government (K.1974/31). By basing these 
decisions on the unconstitutionality of the procedures through which these laws had been enacted, 
the CCT avoided the more difficult question of what sorts of political ideologies and activities 
received protection under the Constitution as well as the question of what sorts of means were 
permissible to achieve these political goals. Simultaneously, however, the Court’s decision freed 
scores of political prisoners, most of them belonging to some brand of left-wing movement. This 
decision created great uproar among right-wing circles as when DP-era President Celal Bayar 
accused the Court of “abandon[ing] our cities to anarchists with bombs and automatic rifles” 
(quoted in Ünsal 1980: 163). 
Beside these controversial rulings on partisan issues, the CCT also made broader 
interpretations of civil liberties during the 1970s. It struck down newly imposed restrictions on 
                                                            
37 Articles 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code. The RPP had had to exempt these articles from the 
amnesty in order to gain the agreement of its coalition partner, the Islamist National Order Party. 
What was lost in the parliament by the RPP was given back to the Republicans by the CCT. 
38 Article 146 of the Criminal Code. 
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trade unions (K.1972/03), associations (K.1973/37), the freedom of assembly (K.1974/09; 
K.1976/51), the right to prove allegations in defamation suits involving civil servants 
(K.1972/60), and struck down increased powers for the police (K.1974/13). 
The CCT was also willing to take on the military on the question of fair trial. The first 
challenge concerned martial-law legislation itself, which restricted the freedom of speech and 
publication, established martial-law courts with military judges, authorized martial-law 
commanders to decide questions of jurisdiction for courts, and extended detention periods up to 
thirty days during emergencies. CCT upheld the restrictions on the freedom of speech and 
publication, but it struck down the provisions setting up military courts and extending detention 
periods (K.1972/05). 
A more severe threat to civil rights from the martial-law era was the establishment of 
State Security Courts through a constitutional amendment followed by legislation. These 
permanent courts would try crimes committed against the security of the state during normal 
times and include military judges alongside civilian judges. With fewer due process guarantees, 
they constituted a fast-track for trying political opponents. The CCT began by establishing 
boundaries on who could be tried in these courts. The judges decided, with a vote of ten to five, 
that the clause “Crimes committed with the general or common purpose to commit crimes 
specified in the A and B clauses, or with the purpose to commit or conceal these, or committed 
because of the crimes specified in the A and B clauses” violated the principle of a “lawful court” 
by being too subjective and arbitrary in defining which crimes fell under the court’s jurisdiction 
(K.1974/21). This decision had the crucial consequence of preventing State Security Courts from 
arbitrarily expanding their domain. The next year, the CCT struck down a portion of the 
constitutional amendment which authorized these courts. The portion that was struck down had 
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exempted State Security Courts from the obligation to select the majority of their judges from 
among the judicial profession during times of war (K.1975/87). Shortly after this decision, the 
CCT handed down its most consequential ruling in the area of fair trial by striking down in toto 
the law establishing State Security Courts (K.1975/126). With a slim majority of eight to seven, 
the judges decided that two articles of the law had not been adequately debated in the Senate, 
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, which, they argued, necessitated the nullification 
of the entire law. Although the procedural argument avoided important substantive human rights 
questions, the decision had enormous practical consequences since in the next five years the 
government would never be able to find the required majority to re-pass the law through a 
constitutionally valid procedure. Thus, the CCT prevented State Security Courts from effectively 
functioning until they re-entered the legal system through the military-engineered 1982 
Constitution.39 
The CCT’s rulings in favor of fair trial show that the CCT was willing to directly 
challenge the military during the 1970s. In this period, the Court delivered its most activist 
rulings on civil rights and liberties, flying in the face of right wing governments, military 
authorities, and the ideology of legal positivism. Shifts within the Republican alliance account 
for this bravery: the martial-law regime’s attack against the legacy of the 1960 “Revolution”, the 
principles and institutions of which were so passionately embraced by Republican quarters 
                                                            
39 The 1982 Constitution included multiple safety measures to ensure that the CCT could not rule 
State Security Courts out of existence again. However, during the 1990s, the ECHR would take 
the lead on this issue by refusing to recognize these courts as “impartial tribunals” and repeatedly 
finding violations of the right to a fair trial, protected by Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
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created divisions within the Republican alliance; the RPP’s turn against the military with 
Ecevit’s election to chairmanship in 1972 made it possible to be a Republican and disagree with 
the army on certain policy questions; and a fledgling though uneasy alliance between left-wing 
movements and the RPP expanded the ideological world of Republican groups. The RPP’s 
attention to rights questions, in turn, affected the jurisprudence of the CCT. As we can see in 
Table 2, the RPP became the most active civil liberties litigant at the CCT during the 1970s. 
Lower courts, too, referred many cases, but these isolated efforts received little attention from 
the CCT, when compared with the high-profile, publicly visible petitions of repeat-player 
political actors. With the closure of the socialist Worker’s Party of Turkey in 1971, the RPP 
became the most active civil rights litigant. RPP’s attention to rights questions was consequential 
because it had a very high success rate at the CCT, unlike the WPT and lower courts, which 
referred many rights questions, but received few favorable outcomes (See Table 2). 
Republicans Approach Kurdish Activists 
A similar tribute to civil rights and liberties occurred briefly during the early 1990s, when 
the Republican Peoples’ Party, now re-organized as the Social Democratic Left Party (SDLP), 
experimented with an alliance with Kurdish activist groups. During this period, SDLP-RPP 
briefly adopted the human rights paradigm to address the Kurdish question and referred to the 
CCT a series of laws and decrees that facilitated human rights abuses in the government’s 
struggle with the armed Kurdish movement for independence. Although the CCT was largely 
conservative on civil rights and liberties during the 1990s, particularly in the area of party 
closures as discussed above, when the SDLP raised human rights arguments at the CCT during 
the early 1990s, the Court made a number of important contributions in this area. 
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After the 1980 regime’s comprehensive crack down on all political parties and 
organizations, left-leaning Republican groups reorganized as the Social Democrat Party, but 
were prevented from participating in the 1983 elections by the military. In 1985, this group was 
joined by the People’s Party, and the Social Democratic People’s Party (SDLP) became the party 
of left-leaning Republicans. In 1990, the SDLP published a report on South-Eastern Turkey, 
where it criticized the continuation of emergency rule in Kurdish areas despite the end of 
military rule in 1983, the military imposed ban on the Kurdish language, the restrictions to rights 
and liberties perpetuated by emergency legislation, the abuse of the rights of innocent citizens in 
the course of the government’s struggle with the PKK (the armed Kurdish organization for 
independence), and the village guard system through which local informants were armed and 
paid by the state in Kurdish zones against supporters of the PKK. In the report, the SDLP argued 
that democracy and human rights should not be perceived as obstacles to combating terrorism 
and that a non-violent solution to the Kurdish question was possible through democratization, 
civic citizenship, socio-economic development, and respect for human rights (Dağıstanlı 1998: 
175-180). 
SDLP simultaneously made an electoral alliance with Kurdish activists and pro-
autonomy Kurdish politicians entered the parliament in 1991. Relations were strained soon after, 
however, on the occasion of the oath ceremony, when Kurdish MPs wore Kurdish national colors 
to the parliament and took the oath in the Kurdish language. A scandalized parliament voted to 
lift the immunity of the Kurdish members. The SDLP itself was divided over its Kurdish 
members: some members voted to lift their immunity, while others, including party leader Erdal 
İnönü, voted against the decision. The Kurdish deputies resigned from the party. 
 CCT Rulings on the Kurdish Question during the 1990s 
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During the early stages of this saga, the SDLP referred three emergency decrees to the 
CCT for constitutional review. According to the 1982 Constitution, the CCT is prohibited from 
reviewing the constitutionality of emergency decrees. However, the Court took the case and 
argued that it could at least review whether the decree actually regulated matters within its 
mandate. The CCT also noted that it could review whether the restrictions on civil rights and 
liberties in emergency decrees were in conformity with Turkey’s obligations under international 
human rights law.40 With this reasoning, the CCT struck down the decree’s provisions restricting 
press freedoms beyond the emergency zone and its provisions which authorized the government 
to expand emergency zones without legislative approval (K.1991/20). 41  The decree also 
prohibited suing state officials in the emergency zone for their actions while discharging their 
emergency duties. This last provision, which provided a blanket protection for officials in the 
                                                            
40 According to international human rights law, certain rights cannot be violated or restricted 
even during periods of emergency. These are the right to life, security of the person, freedom of 
conscience (but not expression), the presumption of innocence, and the prohibition on 
retrospective punishment. The CCT also affirmed the principle stipulated in the European 
Convention on Human Rights that restrictions on rights and liberties must be proportional and 
cannot exceed those necessary in a democratic society, although it did not actually hold an 
exacting test of whether the restrictions in the decree were proportional and necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court did strike down several provisions of the anti-terror law on this 
basis in a later ruling (K.1992/20). 
41 The CCT had also annulled several provisions of an earlier decree (K.1991/01) but these were 
reintroduced by the government in ways that would pass the constitutionality test.  
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region and a great impediment to human rights litigation within Turkey, was found constitutional, 
although five of the eleven members wrote a dissenting opinion. 
Next, SDLP questioned fourteen articles of the infamous anti-terror law (K.1992/20). The 
law’s controversial definition of terrorism was found constitutional. However, the judges did 
strike down important restrictions on due process rights as well as annulling several protections 
extended to anti-terror law enforcement officials. For instance, the law had limited the maximum 
number of lawyers for defendants charged with terrorism and it had authorized prison officials to 
be present in defendants’ meetings with their lawyers. These provisions were struck down as 
unjustified restrictions of the right to an adequate defense. The CCT also struck down a number 
of protections and privileges that the law granted to anti-terror law enforcement officials: the law 
had established that law enforcement officials would be heard as witnesses in secret sessions; 
that if law enforcement officials themselves were accused of crimes related to the way they 
discharged their duties (such as abuse of authority), they would be prosecuted under the Law on 
the Trial of Civil Servants, which left it up to administrative organs to determine whether a 
judicial hearing was necessary; and that if law enforcement officials were tried in courts of law, 
they would be tried without arrest. The CCT struck these provisions down on grounds of equality 
before the law and on “rule of law” principles. 
Finally, constitutional law professor and veteran Republican Mümtaz Soysal collected 
113 signatures from various MPs in 1996 to challenge the constitutionality of a law covering 
various anti-terrorism regulations. The preamble to the law explained the reasoning behind the 
law as “covering the gap [in anti-terror measures] that would result when emergency rule is 
lifted.” The CCT took three years to deliver a ruling, but when it did, it struck down a provision 
that authorized security officials to shoot to kill when a terror suspect did not obey a security 
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official’s “Stop!” order and attempted to use a weapon. The CCT referred to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and ruled that the provision was an unconstitutional violation of 
the right to life (K.1999/01).42 
Apart from these cases referred by Republican quarters, no political party ever raised 
substantial challenges43 to the constitutionality of the measures in the government’s anti-terror 
strategies, either because they did not wish to, or because the Constitution exempted emergency 
decrees and 1980-1983 era legislation from review44, or because the 1982 Constitution restricted 
the right to petition the Court to the primary opposition party, excluding smaller parties from 
access. Nor did such cases come with any frequency from lower courts. During a decade of grave 
human rights violations, a total of three cases that directly concerned civil rights and liberties 
were referred by lower courts from the Kurdish region (K.1992/36; K.1992/47; K.1999/11).45 
                                                            
42 The CCT also struck down a provision authorizing army officials to determine the duration of 
an operation called by the governor, provisions that exempted certain financial arrangements 
from scrutiny, and a provision authorizing the executive to arbitrarily pardon village guards of its 
liking. 
43 In 1996, the Islamist Welfare Party raised a procedural challenge to the constitutionality of the 
means through which emergency rule was extended in the parliament (K.1996/14). 
44 Many restrictions on civil rights and liberties dated from this era and were thus exempt from 
constitutional review through a provision in the Constitution. The CCT did not take the route of 
invalidating this provision although, based on the fact that the 1982 Constitution was prepared by 
the military, an argument could presumably be made on rule-of-law or human rights grounds. 
45 This count does not include litigation on amnesty laws or the amnesty provisions of the anti-
terror law. 
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The CCT rejected the admissibility of all three of these cases on procedural grounds. In 
retrospect, this dearth of cases makes the SDLP-referred cases seem both exceptional and 
significant. As in the 1970s, Republicans were more likely to persuade the CCT on human rights 
questions. However, Republicans themselves rarely broke their ground with the military to 
embrace political ideologies and movements beyond the ambit of Kemalism. 
 CONCLUSIONS: TURKEY IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
This article has questioned the link between judicial power and the expansion of rights by 
showing that even powerful courts may fail to cultivate a commitment to human rights. Indeed, 
the theoretical problem posed by the persistently selective nature of the CCT’s activism is not 
one specific to Turkey. The Israeli Supreme Court has developed an expansive jurisprudence of 
human rights on nearly every issue except for those relating to Palestinians (Kretzmer 2002). The 
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court has taken up some of the most dangerous questions 
about political opposition in an authoritarian regime (Moustafa 2002; 2003) but has been 
cautious in expanding women’s rights. Newly empowered courts in Canada, New Zealand, and 
South Africa have employed “judicial activism” to expand rights to privacy and personality, but 
have not taken up social justice issues or otherwise challenged neoliberal values (Hirschl 2004: 
14). Even the ECHR, with its unwillingness to recognize Islamic identity and politics as 
deserving legal protection under civil liberties doctrines, has been selective in its approach to 
human rights.46 These conclusions compel us to re-think our assumptions about the automatic 
link between judicial independence, judicial empowerment, and the expansion of rights. In 
                                                            
46 While convicting Turkey for closing down pro-Kurdish political parties, the ECHR has 
approved of the CCT’s decisions closing Islamist parties as well as the CCT’s decisions on the 
headscarf ban. 
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particular, the Turkish case obliges us to abandon the notion that rights “increase” as executive 
power “decreases.” While a relatively fragmented political system may be a necessary condition 
for activist judiciaries, it is far from being sufficient. 
Legal mobilization perspectives provide a fuller account of when and why high court 
judges begin expanding human rights (Galanter 1974; Epp 1998; Dotan 1999; Cichowski 2001, 
2004; Moustafa 2002; 2003). Following Galanter’s argument that repeat players fare better in 
courts than one-shot litigants, Epp claims that rights revolutions occur only when individual 
rights claims are supported by public interest litigation. In this account, the emergence and 
strength of “support structures” within civil society account for the emergence and strength of 
rights revolutions. Moustafa shows that such support structures matter not only for shaping a 
court’s docket towards rights questions, but also because they provide courts with critical support 
when they get in trouble with the executive. The case of the CCT confirms the significance of 
support structure for both the activism and the survival of courts. Had the CCT not had powerful 
allies, such as the military (at least initially), the Republican People’s Party, and to a lesser extent, 
the bureaucracy, university professors and students, it would not have been able to overrule 
major policies of Justice Party governments or of the emergency cabinet of the martial law era. 
Nor would the Court get the opportunity to play a high-profile role in Turkish politics if 
Republican groups did not actively use the Court in their struggles against popular majorities. 
What is less adequately explored in legal mobilization studies is that mobilization does not 
always mean “more rights”. Indeed, the particular support structure of the CCT also accounts for 
why the Court was conservative on many significant rights questions. While Republican groups 
provided the Court with the caseload and support necessary for rulings that challenged the 
government, Republican values and interests also constrained the Court’s potential contribution 
 50 
in the area of civil rights and liberties, institutionalizing a pattern of selective activism. Indeed, it 
was during periods when Republicans were divided among themselves and the Republican 
People’s Party opened its ranks to new political movements that the Court delivered its more 
expansive rulings on civil rights and liberties. Shifts in alliance relationships were thus crucial 
for the Court’s approach to rights questions.  
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Notes: The y-axis on the left denotes percent annulments. Decision outcomes were categorized into three groups: 
annulment (when the CCT found at least one provision of the statute unconstitutional); procedural rejection (when 
the CCT refrained from deciding on various procedural grounds); and rejection (when the CCT rejected the 
complaint and upheld the constitutionality of the statute). Annulment rates were calculated as annulments over total 
number of valid decisions (annulments and rejections), excluding procedural rejections. These rates were then 
converted into percentages.  
 
The secondary y-axis on the right denotes number of decisions. “Number of decisions” refers to the total number of 
constitutional review decisions, excluding party closure and other types of cases. These were compiled by the author 
from the CCT’s official website (www.anayasa.gov.tr). The CCT did not report all procedural rejections in the 
1962-1982 era. Thus, part of the increase in the number of decisions in the post-1984 era may be due to increased 
reporting of procedural rejections. 
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Table 1: Percent annulments with respect to different issue areas, 1962-1982 
 
Issues   1962-70 1971-77 1978-82 1962-82 
Average 
Republican autonomy 
Civil rights and liberties 
Other issues 
84%    (43) 
35%    (45) 
35%  (239) 
80%   (38) 
68%   (26) 
53% (130) 
35%   (19) 
    8%   (33) 




Total 41%  (327) 61% (194) 29% (150) 46% (671) 
 
 
Notes: Columns show changes in level of activism with respect to different issue areas. Rows show changes in level 
of activism over time. Numbers in parentheses next to percentages show the total number of cases in a specific issue 
area, including cases delivered inadmissible (procedural rejections). 
 
Decision outcomes were categorized into three groups: annulment (when the CCT found at least one provision of the 
statute unconstitutional); procedural rejection (when the CCT refrained from deciding on various procedural 
grounds); and rejection (when the CCT rejected the complaint and upheld the constitutionality of the statute). 
Annulment rates were calculated as annulments over total number of valid decisions (annulments and rejections), 
excluding procedural rejections. These rates were then converted into percentages.  
 
Issues areas were categorized as “Republican autonomy” if they involved statutes affecting the autonomy and 
security of civil servants, the judiciary, or the universities; as “Civil rights and liberties” if they involved 
associational and expression rights and liberties (including labor rights to organize and strike) or if they involved 
criminal due process rights. Cases involving sentencing practices and fairness of criminal punishment were excluded 
from the analysis. 
 
Data was compiled by the author from the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Turkey published on the official 





Table 2: Court use and success rates with respect to different litigants in civil rights and 
liberties cases and other questions, 1962-1982 
 
























  37 (75%)  
  50 (70%)b 
   40 (45%) 
Other political actorsc 0 3 0 3 (50%) 51 (70%)    54 (71%) 
Lower courts 16 15 33 64 (24%) 300 (25%) 364 (25%) 
High courts 0 1 0 1   (0%) 66 (81%)    67 (79%) 
Universities - - -       - 21 (45%)    21(45%) 
Other petitionersd 1 - -      1     37        (-)     38       (-) 
Total 45 26 33     104     567      671          
 
Note: “CRL” refers to rulings on civil rights and liberties. Columns show number of referrals and success rates with 
respect to different petitioners. Rows show a petitioner’s success rates in CRL cases over time and success rates in 




                                                            
a WPT, the most active rights-litigant at the CCT, was closed down by a decision of the CCT in 
1971. 
b JP, the arch enemy of not only the RPP but also the CCT during the 1970s emerges as an active 
and successful litigant from these statistics. It should be noted that JP referred forty of these fifty 
cases in 1963, well before the institutionalization of such conflict, during the halcyon days after 
the transition to democracy when the party was searching for a compromise with Republican 
quarters on the status of former DP members. 
c Includes cases brought by nine minor political parties (N=26), the President of the Republic 
(N=6), and groups of deputies from the two houses of parliament (N=22). 
d Includes cases brought by petitioners without standing (N=27), immunity cases of 
parliamentary deputies (N=10), and one party closure case. 
